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BOOK REVIEWS
The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings, by Michael J. Almeida. New York: Rout-
ledge, 2008. Pp. 190. $105.00 (hardback).
GREG WELTY, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary
In The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings, Michael Almeida makes a careful, 
densely-argued case for some surprising revisions to the concept of God 
found within the Anselmian tradition of “perfect being theology.” In doing 
so, he shows that many dilemmas recently posed for perfect being theol-
ogy are in fact unsound (or, at the very least, have not been shown to be 
sound). For once we articulate Anselmian theology by way of recent philo-
sophical advances in “theories of vagueness, the metaphysics of modality, 
theories of dynamic choice, the metaphysics of multiverses and hyper-
space, the logic of moral and rational dilemmas, and metaethical theory” 
(1), we can see that the dilemmas posed for Anselmianism naively impute 
to that theology numerous entailments that do not in fact hold. In these 
cases, “the deliverances of careful reflection might be radically mistaken” 
(1). In short, the philosophical theories just named generate “unfamiliar 
contexts” for a priori reflection that may reveal “metaphysically occluded 
facts” about essential omnipotence, essential omniscience, essential moral 
perfection, essential rational perfection, and necessary existence. Thus, 
these theories can be used to clarify and defend the familiar Anselmian 
concept of God.
In chapter 1 the author examines “Atheistic Arguments From Improv-
ability.” These arguments, including William Rowe’s most recent version 
in Can God Be Free?, start from an “improvability thesis” that is taken to be 
grounded in our a priori concept of moral perfection: “it is impossible that a 
perfect being should actualize a world that is improvable” (13). When con-
joined with the “no best world” thesis, which holds that “there is an infinite 
sequence of ever-improving worlds,” it follows that God “could actualize 
no world at all” (13–14). After formalizing Rowe’s version of this argument, 
Almeida argues that attempts by Thomas Morris and William Hasker to re-
fute Rowe’s improvability thesis beg the question, since they assume from 
the outset that Anselmian perfect beings are coherent. Rather, the author’s 
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way forward is to show that Rowe’s own a priori case for the improvability 
thesis begs the question on behalf of the incoherence of theism. Thus, we 
have little reason to think that Rowe’s argument is sound, even if it is valid.
In chapter 2, “Rational Choice and No Best World,” Almeida considers 
how a perfectly rational agent chooses in the “unfamiliar context” of infi-
nite dynamic choice situations, such as the choice to actualize one world 
from “an infinite sequence of ever-improving worlds” (35). Two principles 
said to guide the choices of essentially perfectly rational agents are the 
Rational Perfection Principle (such an agent always performs his rational re-
quirements) and the Consistency Principle (such an agent can satisfy each of 
his rational requirements). Almeida shows that these principles, together 
with some further conditions on rationality (R0–R3), generate a contra-
diction in the context of infinite dynamic choice. The author’s proposal is 
to retain R0–R3 and reject RPP, thus concluding that a perfectly rational 
agent can actualize an improvable world (i.e., a world that is not as good 
as another world he could have actualized).
I am not persuaded by Almeida’s case for retaining R0–R3 and rejecting 
RPP. Almeida says that RPP is invalid in this context, since “fulfilling every 
rational requirement at every world is impossible” (43). Given RPP, Thor 
would be permitted and not permitted to actualize any particular world. 
But if the impossibility of fulfilling a principle is sufficient for its invalidity, 
then why can’t we run the same argument against R0–R3? Almeida’s idea 
is that it is too “radical” to deny R2 or R3, since rejecting these principles 
involves Thor actualizing a less-than-best world in the sequence. But it 
seems to me that if it is impossible for Thor to do anything other than actu-
alize a less-than-best world (including wd, the “default world”), it follows 
that rejecting R2 or R3 helps Thor avoid an impossibility. And this is the 
same reason the author gives for rejecting RPP. Thus, while Almeida has 
given a plausible argument for the rejection of RPP, it is no more plausible 
than those that can be given for the rejection of R0–R3.
Chapter 3, “On Evil’s Vague Necessity,” tackles Peter van Inwagen’s 
attempted refutation of the “standard position on evil” (the idea that an 
Anselmian perfect being would not permit any cases of gratuitous evil). 
Van Inwagen claims that since (i) some evil is necessary for divine pur-
poses, and yet (ii) no evil is the minimum necessary for divine purposes, 
therefore (iii) “a perfect being can realize his divine purposes only if he per-
mits more than the minimum evil necessary” (58). Since no evil can exceed 
the minimum necessary (there is no minimum here), God might permit 
gratuitous evil after all. Almeida provides an elegant refutation of (ii) (the 
No Minimum Thesis), and argues that its most reasonable replacement—
a Vague Minimum Thesis formulated in accordance with supervaluation 
semantics—does not threaten the standard position on evil. A perfect being 
might permit indefinitely unnecessary evil, even if he does not permit definitely 
unnecessary evil. Supervaluationism shows that “there is no discrete tran-
sition from the evil unnecessary for divine purposes to the evil necessary 
for divine purposes” (65).
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Whereas chapter 3 examines the problem of no minimum evil, chapter 4 
considers “The Problem of No Maximum Evil.” Warren Quinn’s thought 
experiment about a “self-torturer” was meant to pose a problem for “stan-
dard theories of rational choice” (78): the self-torturer could be perfectly 
rational in accepting (minutely) increasing degrees of pain, even though 
the end state of such a series of rational choices is an intensely painful one 
that the self-torturer has no reason to prefer over his initial state. Like-
wise, an Anselmian perfect being would be perfectly rational in allowing 
gratuitous evil, and given Quinn’s argument there is no maximum to the 
amount of gratuitous evil that such a being would permit.
In response to Frank Arntzenius and David McCarthy, who claim that 
Quinn’s paradox is impossible, Almeida vindicates the possibility of the 
paradox by modeling it in supervaluation semantics. But he also proposes 
a Vague Maximum Thesis that solves the Problem of No Maximum Evil, using 
supervaluationism to undercut positions that implicitly depend on arbi-
trary precisification of vague predicates (e.g., a state “is more painful than” 
another state). In this unfamiliar context, we may be surprised to learn the 
following metaphysical fact: an Anselmian perfect being can permit any 
of a number of indefinitely painful states. Indeed, “a perfect being need not 
prevent indefinite evils” (87). Almeida goes too far, however, claiming, 
“the standard position on evil prohibits essentially perfectly good beings 
from permitting any definitely painful experiences” (8; cf. 87). Surely the 
“standard position” of Rowe and others is that God would prevent gratu-
itous pain, not definite pain per se.
The author tackles “the Logic of Perfection” in chapter 5. Principle A (it 
is morally necessary that essentially perfectly good agents never actual-
ize worlds that are less good than some alternative) and the Moral Perfec-
tion Principle (an essentially perfectly good agent satisfies all of its moral 
requirements) together entail that there is no essentially perfectly good 
agent, at least “in contexts of infinitely improving worlds” (93). Almeida 
responds to this dilemma by arguing that A, MPP, and the No Best World 
hypotheses are inconsistent. But rather than arbitrarily rejecting one of 
these principles, Almeida defends a Logic of Imperfection that explains how 
MPP is not only false but necessarily false. Surprisingly, Anselmian perfect 
beings might fail to fulfill a moral requirement. In fact, it might be that an 
“essentially perfectly good agent in a necessary moral dilemma must fail 
to satisfy (at least) one moral requirement in every possible world” (104).
According to the property-identical divine command theory (PDCT) 
defended by Robert Adams and William Alston, “being obligatory” and 
“being commanded by God” are the same properties (though they are not 
the same concepts). Their identity is like that which holds between water 
and H2O, or between being gold and being the element with atomic num-
ber 79 (110). In chapter 6, “Supervenience, Divine Freedom, and Absolute 
Orderings,” the author considers Mark Murphy’s argument that the Free 
Command Thesis (the freedom of God’s commands depends on their not 
being wholly fixed by nonmoral facts) and the Supervenience Thesis (moral 
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properties supervene on nonmoral properties) are independently plau-
sible theses that together exclude PDCT. If God’s commands do not super-
vene on nonmoral facts (i.e., they are free), but being morally obligatory 
does supervene on nonmoral facts (the supervenience thesis), then being 
commanded by God is not identical to being morally obligatory.
Space does not permit an assessment of Almeida’s reply to Murphy, 
except to say that (i) it strikes me as quite rigorous, and (ii) his examples 
do seem to support his conclusion that Murphy’s challenge makes “mis-
taken assumptions about the substitutivity of metaphysical identicals in 
contexts of supervenience” (111). His crucial move is to argue that while 
God’s commands may not supervene on nonmoral facts in the world (and 
so in virtue of that are free), they may supervene on God’s own purposes, 
plans, and desires. In effect, “divine purposes” might “determine which 
moral standards obtain from world to world” (118). Of course, Almeida is 
clear that this freedom has limits (119).
Almeida articulates principles of “Vague Eschatology” in chapter 7, in 
response to Ted Sider’s argument about the principle of justice that an 
Anselmian perfect being must use to distribute rewards and punishments 
to moral agents. Sider argues that such a principle must respect degrees 
of goodness in these agents, and if it does so, then it cannot be that “some 
people go determinately and eternally to heaven,” while others “go de-
terminately and eternally to hell” (124). These latter eschatological claims 
must therefore be rejected. Almeida’s response is to “offer a countermodel 
in supervaluation semantics to the proportionality of justice condition” 
(124). This unfamiliar context helps us see “that the predicates ‘is morally 
worse than’ and ‘is irredeemably evil’ do not sharply divide their positive 
and negative extensions” (128). In this respect his argument deploys strat-
egies previously pursued in chapters 3 and 4.
The author closes his book with chapter 8, “Theistic Modal Realism, 
Multiverses, and Hyperspace.” According to Philip Quinn, if an Ansel-
mian perfect being creates, he must create a world unsurpassable in moral 
goodness. But since such a being can actualize only one possible world, it 
follows that “the actual world, with all of its evil, is as good as any other 
logically possible world” (135). To the extent that this latter proposition is 
unlikely, Anselmian theists have a problem on their hands, which Almeida 
calls the Less-Than-Best Problem. The author’s preferred response is “the-
istic modal realism” (TMR), the view that “every possible world is a real, 
concrete universe out there” (135), in the manner of David Lewis’s modal 
realism. Thus, if there are any logically possible worlds that surpass our 
world in moral goodness, it follows that a perfect being has created those 
too, and there is no reason why those better worlds should be our world. 
Almeida defends this view against rival theories, such as Donald Turner’s 
Multiverse Solution, Derek Parfit’s All-Worlds Hypothesis, and Hud Hudson’s 
Hyperspace Solution.
In contrast to each of the previous chapters, the strategy pursued here 
seems self-defeating. First, Almeida repeatedly raises problems for Turner, 
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Parfit, and Hudson that seem to apply to his own theory as well. For 
instance, Hudson’s view is untenable because “there is the bizarre metaphys-
ical consequence that everything that could happen does happen” (163). 
But on TMR, everything that could happen does happen. Yes, it happens in 
other worlds, but it does happen, because on TMR those worlds are just as 
spatiotemporally real as our world. Lewis’s indexical account of “actuality” 
doesn’t get around this fact. Similar considerations apply to the author’s 
charges that Turner’s and Hudson’s views are necessitarian and threaten 
divine freedom, and that Parfit’s view is unintuitive—these criticisms seem 
to apply to TMR as well. If God creates all possible worlds, then in what 
sense is the existence of any world a contingent matter? If he refrains from 
creating a world, it would simply be created by another Anselmian being. 
(Or that world wouldn’t so much as exist, which quite implausibly makes 
the existence of possible worlds contingent.) In addition, if God could refrain 
from creating any possible world (thus preserving his alleged contingency 
of choice), then in what sense is he in the Lifeguard Situation outlined in 
section 8.6? Again, if Parfit’s view is to be faulted because “there is simply 
no reason to believe that every possible world is actual” (11, cf. 136), then 
why should we believe, alternatively, that “every possible world is a real, 
concrete universe out there” (11)? Are we to suppose that intuition supports 
this latter claim over the former?
Second, the proposal seems theologically objectionable as well. Almeida 
suggests that “at each possible world a perfect being actualized that 
world” (138). But if a real being created each real universe, doesn’t that 
mean there really are infinite gods? Or, at best, an infinite number of acts 
of world-creation? Thus, it’s not clear we have a solution here to the Less-
Than-Best Problem that many Anselmians will want. Furthermore, if the 
problem was to explain how the actual world with all of its evil could be 
reconciled with God’s moral perfection, then TMR seems to make things 
worse. Now God is in the business of actualizing, not only the actual 
world with its evil, but every logically possible world with its evil as well. 
(Perhaps, if TMR entails polytheism, the stigma of actualizing an infinite 
amount of evil is divided up among an infinite number of perfect beings?) 
And if creation is, as Almeida seems to suppose, the actualization of a 
possible world, then the possible worlds exist logically prior to the act of 
creation. In which case, what sense can be attached to the notion of God’s 
creating all possible worlds? There seems to be a circularity problem here. 
Finally, the “necessity of preventable evil” thesis forwarded by the author 
seems extremely counterintuitive. It would be not just surprising, but in-
credible, to discover that a perfectly good, knowledgeable, powerful, and 
necessarily existent God has no control over whether a very bad world 
gets actualized. He couldn’t simply refrain from creating at all?
Despite these quibbles, The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings makes a substan-
tive case for challenging “some common and blithe assumptions about the 
implications of moral perfection, omniscience, omnipotence, and other at-
tributes” (34). The book is a worthy “sequel” of sorts to Thomas Morris’s 
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Anselmian Explorations, the difference being that—in comparison with 
Morris’s volume—the technical machinery utilized to assess various An-
selmian claims is considerably enlarged and sophisticated. Almeida’s pre-
sentation is often couched in the symbolism of quantified modal logic, and 
interacts with an impressively large swath of published material on divine 
freedom, the problem of evil, divine command theory, and related topics. 
Although he follows in a long line of philosophers of religion who have 
devoted attention to the coherence of theism, the author’s unique contri-
bution in this volume is to (i) assess the divine attributes in “unfamiliar 
contexts” generated by recent philosophical advances, (ii) argue that these 
contexts reveal surprising implications of the Anselmian “package” of di-
vine attributes, and thereby (iii) make a sustained case that many recent 
dilemmas posed for Anselmianism lack cogency. His thesis about “meta-
physically occluded facts” should be of great interest to practitioners of 
philosophical theology, who are often asked (or ask others) to take a fairly 
permissive stance on the ability of a priori intuition alone to reach reliable 
judgments about metaphysical matters.
Anselm on Freedom, by Katherin Rogers. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. Pp. 217.
HUGH J. MCCANN, Texas A&M University
The thesis of this book is that in his writings on free will, Anselm attempts 
the first systematic libertarian analysis of freedom. The author develops 
her thesis in significant part by contrasting Anselm’s position with that of 
Augustine, whose views on the subject lay at the center of Anselm’s own 
theological heritage. Her strongest focus is on what Anselm has to say in 
De Casu Diaboli about the fall of the angels, but ample attention is paid to 
his other writings as well, and frequent use is made of concepts developed 
by contemporary writers on free will.
The book’s Introduction characterizes libertarianism as involving two 
key principles: that a libertarian free choice cannot be determined, causally 
or otherwise, by anything outside the agent’s own choosing; and that such 
a choice must ultimately originate in, or be caused by, the agent himself (5). 
This leads directly to the problem that is the book’s central focus. Classical 
theism, which Rogers describes in chapter 1, held it as a non-negotiable 
principle that as creator, God is the cause of all that is not God. Anything 
having positive ontological status either is God or comes from God, who 
sustains all things in being throughout their existence (16). The problem is 
to reconcile this with libertarian freedom, which would appear to exclude 
such a role for God when it comes to human choices. We are told in chapter 
2 that Augustine’s solution to this problem is to adopt compatibilism—a 
position, says Rogers, that he maintained throughout his career. To uphold 
